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We investigate the key contractual features of CEO performance-vested (p-v) equity 
compensation. We hypothesize that contractual features such as relative performance 
evaluation (RPE), the performance period length, and the number of performance metrics can 
be configured to improve the informativeness of performance metrics. Consistent with the 
hypotheses, we find that firms using market metrics are more likely to adopt RPE and long 
performance periods than firms using accounting metrics. The effects of performance metrics 
on RPE and performance periods remain prominent after we allow these features to be jointly 
determined. Moreover, we find that RPE is positively associated with longer performance 
periods, suggesting that the two features complement each other in improving the 
informativeness of performance metrics in p-v equity compensation. Our findings not only 
reveal the intricate relations between the contractual features, but also provide empirical 
support for the voting guidelines by proxy advisory services and have implications for the 
evolving practice of executive compensation.  
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Against the backdrop of the ongoing pursuit of pay-for-performance by investors and 
regulators, performance-vested (p-v) equity awards have emerged as a key component of 
CEOs’ long-term compensation in US firms. In 2013, 78.2% of non-financial firms in the 
S&P 500 granted p-v equity awards to CEOs, a marked increase from 58.1% in 2006 (Table 
7, Panel A). The growing popularity of p-v equity compensation suggests the necessity of 
having a thorough understanding of its contractual design. 
Different from traditional time-vested (t-v) equity compensation, a p-v equity award 
requires recipients to achieve pre-determined performance targets before vesting. Since 2006, 
firms have been required to disclose detailed performance provisions of p-v equity awards in 
their proxy statements. For example, Intel discloses its p-v equity award as follows:  
“OSUs granted to the listed officers in 2012 have a three-year performance period from 
the grant date… The number of shares of Intel common stock to be received at vesting will 
range from 50% to 200% of the target amount, based on the TSR [total shareholder return] of 
Intel common stock measured against the TSR of the technology peer group over a three-year 
period.” 1  
In this example, the vesting of Intel’s p-v equity grant is based on a single performance 
metric—TSR, which is measured over a three-year performance period and benchmarked 
against Intel’s peers, a feature called relative performance evaluation (RPE).2 The complexity 
of p-v equity compensation contracts not only raises an important issue concerning the 
optimality of its design, but also poses practical challenges for shareholders seeking to 
evaluate such contracts and for firms trying to design them. In this study, we investigate the 
1 From Intel’s 2012 proxy statement (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000119312513138873/d424609ddef14a.htm). OSU stands 
for outperformance stock unit. 




                                                 
determination and interdependence of the key contractual features of CEO p-v equity 
compensation. Specifically, we examine (i) whether the salient contractual features in CEO p-
v equity compensation, such as the use of RPE, the performance period length, and the 
number of metrics, depend on the type of performance metrics, (ii) firms’ choice of 
performance metrics, and the joint determination of performance metrics and the other three 
contractual features, and (iii) whether RPE, the performance period length, and the number of 
metrics complement or substitute for each other in enhancing the informativeness of 
performance metrics.  
A thorough investigation of these questions is warranted for several reasons. First, p-v 
equity compensation has attracted increasing scrutiny from investors. Prominent proxy 
advisory services such as the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis have 
issued voting guidelines that call for close examination of the contractual features of p-v 
equity awards. Certain features, such as RPE, long performance periods, and multiple 
metrics, have been deemed to be elements of a well-structured incentive plan (Glass Lewis 
2015, p. 29; more details in Appendix A; ISS 2015, pp. 38-39). However, despite the growing 
importance of p-v equity compensation, our knowledge of its contractual design remains 
limited.3 Also, evidence is lacking with respect to whether proxy advisory services’ 
recommendations have an empirical basis or whether such designs are indeed beneficial. 
Second, p-v equity compensation provides a unique and rich setting to investigate the 
contractual features of executive compensation. Many features of p-v equity compensation 
are not present in annual bonuses and t-v equity compensation and have not been thoroughly 
investigated in the literature.4 For example, RPE is a common feature in p-v equity 
compensation, whereas it is rarely used in annual bonuses. The performance period of p-v 
3 We are only aware of a few prior studies on the design of p-v equity compensation; see, e.g., Bettis et al. 
(2010); Bettis et al. (2016); De Angelis and Grinstein (2015). 
4 Most prior research focuses on annual bonuses and t-v equity compensation (e.g., Lambert and Larcker 1987; 
Ittner et al. 1997; Core et al. 2003; Matějka et al. 2009). 
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equity compensation varies considerably in length, while it is nearly always one year in 
annual bonuses.  
More importantly, the coexistence of all these explicit performance features in p-v equity 
compensation allows us to examine their intricate relations. Existing literature has primarily 
examined individual features of equity compensation in isolation.5 Because the terms of p-v 
equity compensation contracts are likely negotiated in an integrated manner, treating 
individual contractual features in isolation limits our understanding of these complex 
compensation contracts. In this paper, we depart from prior studies by explicitly addressing 
the joint determination of contractual features of p-v equity compensation. 
Our main objective is to examine the relations between performance metrics and three 
salient contractual features of p-v equity compensation: RPE, the performance period length, 
and the number of metrics. Linking vesting to the achievement of performance targets, p-v 
equity compensation tends to incentivize recipients more effectively than traditional t-v 
equity compensation. However, because the payout is subject to achievement of performance 
targets, p-v equity compensation also entails higher volatility than traditional equity 
compensation. We argue that firms can mitigate the extra volatility in p-v equity 
compensation through contractual features such as RPE, the performance period length, and 
the number of metrics, all of which play a role in influencing the informativeness of 
performance metrics. Specifically, RPE helps filter out performance-irrelevant common 
shocks that affect market metrics more than accounting metrics. Moreover, extending 
performance periods can smooth out short-term volatility in market metrics (Campbell and 
Viceira 2002). Considering that market metrics incorporate more forward-looking and richer 
information (Collins et al. 1987), firms using market metrics may need fewer additional 
5 For example, Carter et al. (2009) study the use of RPE in p-v equity compensation, Cadman et al. (2013) 




                                                 
performance metrics. Therefore, we hypothesize that, in p-v equity compensation, firms using 
market metrics are more likely to adopt RPE, set longer performance periods, and use fewer 
performance metrics than firms using accounting metrics. 
We test these predictions in a sample of S&P 500 industrial firms that granted p-v equity 
compensation to CEOs between 2006 and 2013. The results show that firms using market 
metrics are more likely to adopt RPE and set longer performance periods than firms using 
accounting metrics. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses that RPE and the 
performance period are tuned to enhance the informativeness of performance metrics and to 
insulate recipients from excessive risk. However, we do not find that firms with market 
metrics use fewer metrics.  
While the preceding analyses treat firms’ choice of performance metrics as exogenous, 
we proceed to examine explicitly the use of market metrics in CEO p-v equity compensation. 
The results show that firms with less noisy market metrics, more complex operations, and 
better past stock performance are more likely to use market metrics than accounting metrics. 
When re-examining the determination of the three contractual features (RPE, performance 
period length, and number of metrics) jointly with that of performance metrics, we obtain 
robust findings confirming that RPE and long performance periods are more likely to coexist 
with market metrics. 
In the third analysis, we examine the interdependence of RPE, the performance period 
length, and the number of metrics. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether these 
contractual features complement or substitute for each other in CEO p-v equity 
compensation. The results show that RPE complements longer performance periods, 
consistent with the prediction that firms configure a multitude of contractual features to filter 
out compensation risk and enhance the informativeness of performance metrics. 
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In the supplementary analyses, we confirm that the relations between the contractual 
features of p-v equity compensation are robust after considering the firm’s choice of granting 
p-v equity awards, the use of compensation consultants, and the impacts of other forms of 
compensation such as stock options and annual bonuses. We also find that firms designing 
their CEO p-v equity compensation according to our hypotheses (i.e., using market metrics 
with RPE and long performance periods) subsequently outperform the rest of the firms. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature as well as the evolving 
compensation practice. First, we contribute to the underdeveloped research on the complexity 
of compensation contracts (e.g., Kole 1997). Unlike prior studies that examine individual 
features of equity compensation contracts in isolation (e.g., Carter et al. 2009; Matějka et al. 
2009; De Angelis and Grinstein 2015), we approach these features collectively. This 
systematic approach reveals the intricate relations between contractual features and better 
captures the complex nature of compensation design. Second, we add evidence for the design 
of p-v equity compensation, the fastest-growing form of executive performance pay among 
US firms. The unique features of p-v equity compensation contracts, such as the frequent use 
of market metrics and RPE and the wide variation in performance periods, allow us to test 
one of the principles in compensation design—incentive-risk trade-off. Third, the findings in 
our study have implications for the evolving practice of executive equity compensation. The 
documented relations between key p-v contractual features and the performance consequence 
of compensation design provide an empirical basis for the voting guidelines by proxy 
advisory services, which endorse certain contractual features of p-v equity awards as 
favorable (Glass Lewis 2015; ISS 2015). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature and 
develops the hypotheses. The sample and data are described in Section III. We discuss the 
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empirical results in Section IV. Section V presents the supplementary analyses and Section 
VI concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 P-v equity compensation and related literature 
In the past decade, US firms have significantly increased grants of p-v equity awards 
which link the vesting to the achievement of performance targets. Among S&P 500 industrial 
firms, the percentage granting p-v equity awards to CEOs increases from 58.1% in 2006 to 
78.2% in 2013 (Table 7, Panel A). Over the same period, p-v equity compensation as a 
percentage of total compensation value rises from 18% to 29% (Panel A, Figure 1). Evans et 
al. (2017) report a similar trend in a broader sample of S&P 1500 firms.  
Early evidence shows that firms grant p-v equity compensation to incentivize executives 
and to sort managerial talents, rather than to extract rent or placate stakeholders (Gerakos et 
al. 2007; Bettis et al. 2010). Based on a larger and more recent sample, Bettis et al. (2016) 
provide additional insights concerning the valuation and incentive properties of p-v equity 
awards. However, Abernethy et al. (2015) show that powerful CEOs influence the adoption 
and design of p-v stock options for their own benefits.  
While p-v equity compensation is a relatively recent phenomenon in the US, it has been 
popular in the UK, mostly in the form of p-v stock options, due to the influence of the 
corporate governance code issued by the Greenbury Committee in 1995. Several studies have 
investigated the use of p-v stock options by UK firms. For example, Câmara (2001) 
analytically demonstrates that p-v stock options with RPE do not provide stronger incentives 
to executives to improve shareholder wealth than traditional t-v stock options, but they do 
encourage executives to take on risky projects. Kuang and Qin (2009) find evidence that, 
compared to t-v stock options, p-v stock options are associated with greater interest alignment 
between executives and shareholders.  
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2.2 Prior literature on compensation contract features 
Performance metrics, especially those used in annual bonuses, have been well studied in 
the literature (e.g., Lambert and Larcker 1987; Ittner et al. 1997; Core et al. 2003; Matějka et 
al. 2009; De Angelis and Grinstein 2015). These studies commonly find that, consistent with 
the informativeness principle (Holmstrom 1979), the choice of metrics—for example, 
accounting versus market (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Core et al. 2003) or financial versus 
non-financial (Ittner et al. 1997; Matějka et al. 2009)—is related to the metric’s relative 
informativeness. Strategy and past performance also affect the choice of performance metrics 
(Ittner et al. 1997; De Angelis and Grinstein 2015). 
RPE is another contractual feature that has attracted academic interest. The early literature 
only tests the “implicit” use of RPE (e.g., Janakiraman et al. 1992; Murphy 1999) because 
few US firms disclosed the use of RPE in executive compensation prior to 2006. One 
exception is Carter et al. (2009), who employ UK data to examine the use and characteristics 
of RPE in CEO p-v equity compensation. They find some evidence that the adoption of RPE 
is associated with economic factors such as common shocks, industry concentration, and a 
CEO’s ability to hedge. Since the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) regulation 
on compensation disclosure in 2006, the data on RPE use in US executives’ performance-
based pay have become directly available, and several studies have documented the economic 
determinants of RPE adoption (Gong et al. 2011; Bettis et al. 2014).  
Few studies have examined other contractual features such as the performance period. 
Among the exceptions, Evans et al. (2017) theorize and empirically test whether the 
performance period is designed to facilitate the sorting of managerial talents. Cadman et al. 
(2013) examine the determination of vesting terms for t-v stock options and report that the 
vesting terms are longer in firms with higher growth, less powerful CEOs, and more 
institutional holdings.  
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2.3 Hypothesis development 
The literature has long viewed performance metrics as a central feature of executive 
compensation contracts and demonstrated that the choice of performance metrics plays a 
pivotal role in determining the efficacy of p-v equity compensation (e.g., Holmstrom 1979; 
Bushman and Smith 2001). The voting guidelines of proxy advisory services also suggest the 
choice of performance metrics as a key consideration from shareholders’ standpoint (Glass 
Lewis 2015). Therefore, we argue that most firms prioritize the choice of performance 
metrics when designing p-v equity compensation. Once the performance metrics are chosen, 
firms next consider other contractual features such as RPE, the performance period length, 
and whether to use additional performance metrics to improve the informativeness of 
performance metrics. Moreover, in proxy statements, firms usually explain and justify the 
choice of performance metrics more carefully than the rest of the contractual arrangements 
such as RPE and performance periods.6 To the extent that the presentation in the proxy 
statement indicates the importance and decisional sequence from firms’ standpoint, this 
observation provides additional support for the presumed decisional sequence in designing p-
v equity compensation.7 
We hypothesize that the choice of performance metrics is associated with three salient 
contractual features of p-v equity compensation: RPE, the performance period length, and the 
number of metrics. Unlike t-v equity compensation, p-v equity compensation subjects the 
vesting to the achievement of performance criteria and thus injects additional volatility into 
6 For example, Coca-Cola states in its 2012 proxy statement: “…growth in economic profit has been chosen as 
the performance measure for the annual awards because it is an important measure of the Company’s long-
term strength and is historically correlated with stock price over time. ... A three-year performance period was 
selected to mirror our long-term business planning cycle.” 
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/21344/000130817913000057/lcocacola2013_def14a.htm#_N57) 
7 We acknowledge that some firms may not follow exactly the decision sequence as described above. For 
example, they may decide the use of RPE or the length of performance period first or decide these contractual 
features simultaneously. Regardless of the decision process, the contents of our hypotheses remain intact. That 
is, we still predict a positive relation between the use of market metrics and the use of RPE/long performance 
periods and a negative relation between the use of market metrics and the number of metrics used in p-v 
equity compensation.  
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compensation. Mindful of the cost, both firms and CEOs strive to negotiate terms that 
alleviate excess volatility induced by p-v equity compensation.  
While numerous types of performance metrics are used for executive compensation in 
practice, they fall into two broad categories: market metrics and accounting metrics.8 Market 
metrics are distinct from accounting metrics and are generally considered to be more timely 
and informative (e.g., Beaver et al. 1987; Collins et al. 1987; Freeman 1987). In the following 
hypotheses, we focus on the ways in which the three contractual features filter noise out of 
market metrics and reduce the volatility of compensation. 
Use of RPE. Agency theory suggests that RPE should be used when a performance metric 
contains significant shocks that are common among peers (e.g., Baiman and Demski 1980; 
Holmstrom 1982). Compared to accounting metrics, market metrics move more closely with 
broad stock markets and are more subject to common shocks. By benchmarking against its 
peers, a firm can effectively filter out common shocks and enhance the informativeness of 
market metrics. Moreover, implementing RPE for market metrics is less expensive than it is 
for accounting metrics because stock prices or returns of peers are consistently defined and 
easily accessible. In contrast, accounting metrics are less comparable across firms because a 
large variety of accounting metrics is used in practice, and the wide use of accounting 
measures that do not conform to generally accepted accounting principles  makes it even 
more challenging to compare performance across companies. 
 H1: In p-v equity compensation, the use of RPE is more strongly associated with 
market metrics than with accounting metrics.  
 
Performance period length. The type of performance metrics also has implications for the 
performance period. Short-term market movements disproportionately affect stock 
8  In the final sample of this paper (1,442 firm years), 60.8% uses only accounting metrics in their CEO p-v 
equity compensation, 21.1% uses only market metrics, 16.9% uses both accounting and market metrics, and 
1.2% uses other types of performance metrics. See Section 3.2 for more details.  
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returns/prices and render these metrics too volatile over short horizons (e.g., Campbell and 
Viceira 2002). By extending performance periods, a firm can smooth out short-term, 
performance-irrelevant fluctuations in market metrics, which allows market metrics to 
capture managerial efforts more effectively. In contrast, accounting metrics are not as volatile 
as market metrics (Chen et al. 2012), so firms using accounting metrics may not benefit as 
much from long performance periods as firms using market metrics. This argument leads to 
our second hypothesis.   
 H2: In p-v equity compensation, longer performance periods are more strongly 
associated with market metrics than with accounting metrics. 
 
Number of metrics. Firms must balance cost and benefit when deciding how many 
performance metrics to use in p-v equity compensation. On the one hand, employing multiple 
metrics enhances the overall precision of the combined signal and may improve the efficacy 
of compensation contracts. On the other hand, measuring executives’ performance against 
multiple metrics can be costly because extra metrics introduce additional volatility into 
compensation and complicate the performance evaluation process. Given that market metrics 
embed richer information than accounting metrics (e.g., Collins et al. 1987), it is plausible to 
suggest that firms using a market metric for p-v equity compensation do not need additional 
metrics to improve informativeness of performance metrics, especially if the cost of using 
additional metrics outweighs their informational benefit. Therefore, we predict that firms 
using market metrics in p-v equity compensation are less likely to use extra performance 
metrics. In contrast, firms that use accounting metrics in p-v equity compensation are more 
likely to use multiple metrics because a single accounting metric often does not suffice to 
capture executives’ complex and multi-faceted decisions. Hence, we hypothesize9: 
9 H3 is developed on the premise that firms trade informational benefit against measurement cost associated 
with the use of multiple metrics. This trade-off argument is only meaningful if the measurement cost is 
substantial. Due to the unobservable nature of the measurement cost, we view the relation between the choice 
10 
 
                                                 
 H3: In p-v equity compensation, firms using market metrics are less likely to use 
multiple metrics than firms using accounting metrics.  
 
III. SAMPLE, DATA, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Sample and data 
Our sample is composed of S&P 500 industrial firms (excluding financial services and 
utilities) that granted p-v equity compensation to CEOs from 2006 through 2013.10 This set 
of firms was chosen because they represent the broad economy well, and their compensation 
practices are likely to influence those employed by other firms. The sample period starts from 
2006 because that is the first year when firms followed the SEC’s new regulation on 
compensation disclosure and disclosed detailed features of executive compensation in proxy 
statements. 
Contractual features of p-v equity compensation, such as the type and number of 
performance metrics and the performance period length, are obtained from the compensation 
consulting firm Equilar. Among the p-v equity awards granted to the sample firms’ CEOs, 
61.5% is in the form of restricted stock units, followed by 35.3% in the form of restricted 
stock, while the remaining 3.2% is in the form of stock options and stock appreciation rights 
(SARs). In our sample, 83.1% of firm years only grants one p-v equity award to CEOs, and 
the remaining 16.9% grants more than one p-v equity award. In the reported analyses, we 
only use the contractual features of the award with the largest fair value at the grant date.11 In 
addition, we collect the RPE data by hand from proxy statements.  
Additional data are obtained from diverse sources: accounting data from COMPUSTAT, 
stock prices and returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), CEO 
of performance metrics and the use of multiple metrics as essentially an empirical issue, and our aim here is 
more exploratory than explanatory. 
10 The earlier version of our paper uses p-v equity compensation of all named executives. The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
11  The inclusion of multiple p-v equity awards does not alter our key findings and inferences materially.  
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compensation data from ExecuComp, and corporate governance data from RiskMetrics and 
Thomson Financial. The final sample contains 1,442 firm-years and 331 unique firms (see 
Table 1 for the detailed sample construction process). All variables in this paper are defined 
in Appendix B. 
From 2006 to 2013, the relative importance of p-v equity awards in executives’ overall 
compensation packages has increased. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that p-v equity 
compensation as a percentage of total compensation value rose from 18% in 2006 to 29% in 
2013. Panel B of Figure 1 indicates that, within long-term equity compensation, the 
percentage of p-v equity compensation also grew from 35% in 2006 to 45% in 2013. 
3.2 Contractual features of p-v equity awards 
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the frequencies of performance metrics used in p-v equity 
compensation, which fall into the following types: earnings (52.0%), asset utilization 
(28.7%), sales (23.2%), cash (10.5%), collectively referred to as accounting metrics; market 
metrics based on stock prices and returns (38.1%); other financial  metrics (6.4%); and non-
financial metrics (5.3%).12 The data also reveal changes in practice over time. For example, 
firms increase the use of market metrics (from 30.3% in 2006-2008 to 41.4% in 2009-2013) 
but decrease their reliance on earnings or asset utilization metrics (from 55.2% and 34.7% in 
2006-2008 to 50.6% and 26.1% in 2009-2013). 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the use of RPE in p-v equity compensation. A firm is 
considered to use RPE if any performance metric in its CEO p-v equity compensation is 
benchmarked against its peers or an index. In our sample, 40.5% adopts RPE, while the 
12  Earnings metrics include measures derived from earnings (or profits), such as net income, adjusted net 
income, operating income, and earnings growth. Asset utilization metrics include return on equity, return on 
assets, return on invested capital, and economic value added®, among others. Sales (cash) metrics include 
those derived from sales/revenue (cash flows), both level and growth. Examples of non-financial metrics 
include customer satisfaction, safety, and innovation. Given the wide variety of performance metrics used in 
practice, we used our judgment in the categorization in some cases. 
12 
 
                                                 
remaining firms set targets without reference to peers’ performance.13 Panel B also reports 
the length of the period over which performance is measured to determine the actual payout 
of equity awards. Among the sample firms, 68.5% measures performance over three years. 
The seemingly high proportion of one-year performance periods (20.2%) is puzzling 
considering that nearly all firms claim to use p-v equity awards as a form of long-term 
incentive compensation. 
Panel C shows that slightly more than half of the sample firms (51.9%) use a single 
performance metric, 37.7% uses two metrics, and the rest use more than two metrics. The 
tendency to use fewer metrics appears to contrast with Holmstrom’s (1979) well-known 
argument that firms should rely on multiple metrics as long as each metric provides 
independent information concerning CEOs’ efforts.  
The contractual features of p-v equity compensation are stable over the sample period. 
The persistence of these features partly reflects the fact that firms do not continuously revise 
compensation contracts; they only do so at intervals or after significant corporate events (e.g., 
CEO turnover, merger and acquisition). 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Relations between performance metrics and the other three contractual features 
According to Hypotheses 1–3, in p-v equity compensation the type of performance 
metrics is related to RPE use, the performance period length, and the number of metrics 
because these three features are instrumental in enhancing the informativeness of 
performance metrics and reducing excessive volatility in compensation. We test these 
hypotheses individually using binary choice models. 
13  The prevalence of RPE in our sample differs from that in Bettis et al. (2010). It is worth noting that numerous 
regulatory and economic changes have occurred since the end of the sample period that Bettis et al. (2010) 
used, which largely covers the 1990s. 
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Use of RPE 
To test H1, we model the firm’s decision to use RPE as follows: 
 RPEt = α0 + α1 Markett + α2 ComShkt-1 + α3 IndConcent-1  
     + α4 CEOWltht-1 + α5 CEOAget-1 + α6 |Ret_RkAdj|t-1  
     + α7 AdjROA3t-1 + Controls + εt . 
(1) 
 
The dependent variable RPE equals one if any performance metric in a firm’s CEO p-v 
equity compensation is benchmarked against its peers or an index, and zero otherwise. The 
key independent variable Market equals one if a firm uses market metrics, and zero 
otherwise.14 H1 predicts the coefficient of Market to be positive. The rest of the independent 
variables are based on extensive prior literature (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; Garvey 
and Milbourn 2003; Gong et al. 2011). Holmstrom (1982) theorizes that firms facing more 
common shocks are more likely to adopt RPE to filter out common shocks (ComShk; 
predicted to be positive). Other studies identify settings in which RPE is less beneficial: when 
competition is high (industry competition, IndConcen; predicted to be negative), executives 
are able to self-hedge common shocks (CEO wealth, CEOWlth, and age, CEOAge; both 
predicted to be negative), or when suitable peers are not available (availability of peers, 
|Ret_RkAdj|; predicted to be positive).  
We are mindful that CEOs can take advantage of compensation negotiations to extract 
rent from shareholders. Rent extraction may become more prevalent when CEOs are more 
influential and/or firms have weak monitoring mechanisms or corporate governance. To 
address this issue, Model (1) follows prior literature (e.g., Cadman et al. 2013; Abernethy et 
al. 2015) and includes corporate governance characteristics, namely, institutional holdings 
(IH), the independence of the board of directors (BrdIndp), the dual role of CEO as 
chairperson of the board (Dual), and a newly appointed CEO (CEONew). Following Gong et 
14 The use of market metrics does not preclude firms from using accounting metrics. In our sample, 16.9% of 
firms uses both market and accounting metrics. The results are robust if the sample is restricted to firms using 
either market-based or accounting-based performance metrics only (but not both types).  
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al. (2011), we also control for firm performance (AdjROA3), firm size (Size), and growth 
potential (BM). Model (1) is estimated as a logit regression with year fixed effect and the 
standard errors of coefficient estimates are clustered by firm.  
Panel A of Table 3 shows that among firms that use market metrics in p-v equity 
compensation, the rate of adopting RPE is 87.8%, a stark contrast to the rate of 11.4% among 
firms that use only accounting metrics.15 This pattern is consistent with H1, which suggests 
that RPE is particularly compatible with market metrics. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables in this analysis and 
the correlations between the dependent variable RPE and the independent variables. RPE is 
used in 40.5% of our sample firms, and market metrics are used in 38.1% of our sample 
firms. The average age of the CEO in our sample is 55.95 years. The RPE has higher 
correlations with Market (0.755) than with other variables (e.g., 0.142 with ComShk; -0.079 
with IndConcen).  
Panel C of Table 3 reports the logit estimation of Model (1). Model (1.i) serves as the 
benchmark and includes the determinants of RPE documented in prior literature: common 
shocks (ComShk), competition (IndConcen), self-hedging ability (CEOWlth and CEOAge), 
and availability of peers (|Ret_RkAdj|), among other control variables. Consistent with prior 
empirical findings (e.g., Gong et al. 2011), ComShk carries a positive coefficient, suggesting 
that firms subject to more common shocks are more likely to adopt RPE. Similarly, 
IndConcen has the predicted negative sign, consistent with the notion that high competition 
hinders the use of RPE. The positive coefficient of CEOAge (p<0.05) suggests that RPE is 
more likely to apply to older CEOs, who are less able to diversify the risk of equity grants 
and thus may find RPE more attractive.   
15 Among firms not using market metrics, the vast majority (98.1%) uses accounting metrics, while only 1.9% 
uses “other financial” or “non-financial” metrics. 
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Model (1.ii) includes our main variable of interest, Market. The variable has a positive 
and highly significant coefficient (4.122 with a marginal effect 0.774, p<0.01), which 
confirms H1 suggesting that firms using market metrics are more likely to adopt RPE than 
firms using accounting metrics. In economic terms, the propensity to adopt RPE is 77% 
higher in firms using market metrics than in firms using accounting metrics. More 
importantly, Market effectively renders ComShk, IndConcen, and CEOAge insignificant in 
Model (1.ii), which suggests that the use of market metrics is an essential factor that 
determines the use of RPE and its power dominates the other determinants. This economic 
significance of Market is further evident from the remarkable improvement in the model fit: 
The pseudo R2 rises from 4.7% in (1.i) to 47.8% in (1.ii).  
The additional controls of governance and CEO characteristics in Model (1.iii) do not 
diminish the significance of Market or the main inference of H1. Among the corporate 
governance variables, the positive coefficient of board independence (BrdIndp, 4.574 with a 
marginal effect 1.056, p<0.01) is consistent with Gong et al. (2011), who suggest that firms 
with stronger internal governance favor RPE because RPE limits the pay-for-luck practice 
and also benefits risk-sharing. The positive and significant coefficient of Dual is inconsistent 
with the inference concerning broad independence. A potential interpretation is that 
entrenched CEOs can influence the selection of peers so that RPE works in their favor. 
Performance period length and number of metrics 
H2 pertains to the relation between the type of performance metric and the performance 
period length. We test this using the following binary choice model: 
 LongPeriodt = β0 + β1 Markett + β2 AdjROA3t-1 + β3 ExCasht-1 + β4 Voltt-1  
    + β5 Invst3t-1 + β6 Segmtt-1 + Controls + ξt . 
(2) 
 
The dependent variable LongPeriod equals one if the performance period spans at least 
three years, and zero otherwise. Market is the main independent variable of interest, which 
H2 predicts to carry a positive coefficient. Among the rest of the independent variables in 
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Model (2), we first include variables that capture the need for retention, a key factor that 
determines the length of the vesting period. These variables are included here because two 
thirds of our sample firms have an equal length of performance period and vesting period; the 
same factors that determine the vesting period may also affect the performance period. Based 
on Cadman et al. (2013), the need for retention is high when past performance (measured by 
AdjROA3) is good or when it is costly to replace the existing CEO (measured by a CEO’s 
excessive cash compensation, ExCash). 
The second group of independent variables in Model (2) measures a firm’s decision-
making environment. In uncertain business environments (measured by stock return 
volatility, Volt), short performance horizons expedite the performance evaluation and allow 
timely assessment of executives’ productivity, resulting in better sorting of managerial talent 
(Lazear 1995).  Moreover, when a firm invests extensively and/or operates complex 
businesses (measured by Invst3 and Segmt, respectively), more time is needed to observe the 
consequences of the CEO’s decisions. Therefore, we predict that such firms are more likely 
to choose long performance periods. Model (2) also controls for corporate governance 
characteristics (IH, BrdIndp, Dual, and CEONew). 
We use the following binary choice model to test H3 regarding the number of metrics: 
 MultMetricst = γ0 + γ1 Markett + γ2 Voltt-1 + γ3 Invst3t-1 + γ4 Segmtt-1 
    + Controls + ζt . 
(3) 
 
The dependent variable MultMetrics equals one if a firm uses more than one metric, and 
zero otherwise. Among the independent variables, market metrics, Market, is expected to 
carry a negative coefficient because H3 predicts that firms employing market metrics use 
fewer metrics than those using accounting metrics. Model (3) includes proxies for business 
environment uncertainty (Volt), investment intensity (Invst3), and business complexity 
(Segmt). When a firm operates in an uncertain business environment, invests heavily, or has 
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complex operations, the informativeness of any single metric is likely limited and it may be 
more beneficial to use multiple metrics in compensation contracts. For example, evidence 
shows diminished information quality in complex business environments: Duru and Reeb 
(2002) find that analysts produce less accurate forecasts for complex businesses, and 
Bushman et al. (2004) show that investors are less able to learn about the activities of 
complex organizations. Both Models (2) and (3) control for firm characteristics (BM, Size) 
and corporate governance characteristics (IH, BrdIndp, Dual, and CEONew). 
Panel A of Table 4 compares the performance period length and the number of metrics 
between firms using market metrics and those not using them. The left-hand side of Panel A 
shows that the vast majority of firms that rely on market metrics sets the performance period 
for at least three years (96.0%), whereas the percentage drops to 62.6% among the rest of the 
firms. This pattern is consistent with the prediction in H2 that firms using market metrics are 
more likely to set longer performance periods. H3 predicts that firms using market metrics 
are less likely to use multiple performance metrics in p-v equity compensation. The right-
hand side of Panel A weakly supports this prediction: 45.4% of the firms using market 
metrics chooses additional metrics for their p-v equity compensation, slightly lower than the 
49.7% of firms that does not use market metrics.  
In Panel B of Table 3, the use of market metrics is significantly and positively correlated 
with the use of long performance periods (Pearson correlation 0.376, p<0.01), but its 
correlation with the use of multiple metrics is not significant. Business complexity (measured 
by Segmt) is positively correlated with long performance periods and multiple metrics 
(Pearson correlations 0.060 and 0.052, respectively). 
Panel C of Table 4 empirically tests H2 in the multivariate logit model (2). As in Table 3, 
we compare Model (2.ii) with Model (2.i) to highlight the effect of performance metrics. 
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient for Market is significant and positive (2.654 
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with a marginal effect 0.328, p<0.01). Economically, this finding suggests that, in CEO p-v 
equity awards, firms using market metrics are 32.8% more likely to set long performance 
periods than firms only using accounting metrics. The economic significance of Market is 
also demonstrated by the significant improvement in the model fit: The pseudo R2 of Model 
(2.ii), 16.6%, is more than six times that of Model (2.i). The significant effect of Market is 
robust to the inclusion of the governance and CEO characteristics in Model (2.iii). However, 
the signs of IH, BrdIndp and Dual suggest conflicting inferences for corporate governance. 
One possible reason is that these proxies may not precisely capture the underlying constructs 
of board monitoring and/or CEO entrenchment.   
Panel D of Table 4 presents our test of H3 using the multivariate logit model (3). The 
results show no association between the use of market metrics and the use of multiple metrics 
(Market is insignificant in both Models (3.ii) and (3.iii)). The inconsistency between these 
results and the prediction in H3 may be due to the measurement costs not being high enough 
to influence a firm’s decision to use multiple metrics. Firms therefore prefer additional 
metrics as long as they contribute to new performance-relevant information. Another 
explanation may be that most firms follow the guidelines of Glass Lewis (2015), which 
suggest using multiple metrics for long-term incentive plans.  
In summary, the empirical findings in Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that the choice of 
performance metrics is strongly associated with two important features of CEO p-v equity 
compensation—RPE and the performance period length. The documented relations are 
consistent with the notion that firms use RPE or a long performance period to improve the 
informativeness of market metrics and to reduce excessive volatility in compensation. 
However, we do not find a relation between metric type and the use of multiple metrics.  
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4.2 The choice of performance metrics and joint determination of performance metrics 
and the other contractual features 
The empirical testing of the hypotheses in the preceding section treats the choice of 
performance metrics in p-v equity compensation as exogenous. Given that all the contractual 
features in p-v equity compensation contracts are negotiated as a package, treating the choice 
of metrics as exogenous is less than satisfactory. Moreover, the importance of performance 
metrics warrants an investigation of how firms choose these metrics for p-v equity 
compensation. Therefore, in this section, we start by examining the use of market metrics in 
CEOs’ p-v equity compensation. Drawing on prior theoretical and empirical literature, we 
discuss several factors that affect firms’ choice of market versus accounting performance 
metrics in p-v equity compensation: relative volatility of metrics, nature of business, and past 
performance. 
Relative volatility of metrics. One key implication of the informativeness principle is that 
the weight of a performance metric in compensation contracts decreases with the metric’s 
relative noisiness, which implies that firms should avoid metrics that are too noisy to provide 
information about CEOs’ actions (e.g., Holmstrom 1979; Bushman and Smith 2001). 
Empirically, Lambert and Larcker (1987) find that in annual bonuses, firms give more weight 
to market metrics than to accounting metrics when the variance in accounting metrics is high 
relative to that in market metrics. Provided that the informativeness principle also applies to 
p-v equity compensation, we predict that firms are less prone to use market metrics if the 
relative volatility of market metrics increases. 
Nature of business. The nature of a firm’s business, such as the level of investment 
opportunities and business complexity, is also key to determining the choice of performance 
metrics. Prior research (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992; Baber et al. 1996) argues that it is critical 
for a manager facing substantial investment opportunities to make forward-looking and long-
term decisions. These decisions, however, often have a negative impact on short-term 
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accounting performance. Therefore, linking compensation with accounting metrics may 
create the wrong incentive for managers when many investment opportunities exist. Evidence 
also shows that organizational complexity creates considerable coordination and control 
challenges for managers (e.g., Mittal et al. 2004), suggesting that accounting information may 
not be sufficient to reveal the effort of executives in complex organizations. Therefore, rather 
than using accounting metrics, firms with greater investment opportunities or complex 
business operations are more likely to use market metrics because stock prices and returns are 
forward-looking and incorporate more timely and richer information than accounting metrics. 
Past performance. Matějka et al. (2009) find that firms in financial distress are less likely 
to use non-financial metrics (as opposed to financial metrics) in their CEOs’ annual bonuses, 
suggesting that distressed firms use financial metrics to incentivize CEOs to improve 
profitability and expedite turnaround. In the same vein, one may expect firms with poor stock 
(operating) performance to demand that their CEOs make efforts to improve stock (operating) 
performance. Such firms can do so by linking the vesting of equity awards to the achievement 
of market (accounting) performance targets. 
Empirically, we use the following binary choice model to examine the use of market 
metrics in CEO p-v equity compensation:  
 Markett = c0 + c1 RtVart-1 + c2 Segmtt-1 + c3 Invst3t-1  
    + c4 BHAR3t-1 + c5 AdjROA3t-1 + c6 BMt-1 + c7 Sizet-1 
      + c8 IHt-1 + c9 BrdIndpt-1 + c10 Dualt-1 + c11 CEONewt-1 + εt . 
(4) 
 
The dependent variable Market is defined as before. Among the independent variables, 
we follow Lambert and Larcker (1987) to measure the relative volatility between market and 
accounting metrics (RtVar) as the standard deviation of stock returns divided by the standard 
deviation of return on assets (ROA) over past twelve quarters. The informativeness principle 
predicts the coefficient of RtVar to be negative. Proxying for the nature of business, Segmt 
and Invst3 are predicted to have positive coefficients. BHAR3 (AdjROA3) measures a firm’s 
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stock (operating) performance and is predicted to have a negative (positive) sign. We control 
for the same firm and the corporate governance characteristics as in Models (1) through (3). 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the estimation of Model (4) via logit regressions, where (4.i) 
and (4.ii) differ in the measures of past firm performance. The relative volatility of market 
metrics to accounting metrics (RtVar) has a negative coefficient as expected: When market 
metrics are noisier than accounting metrics, they are less likely to be used in p-v equity 
compensation. As predicted, both business complexity (Segmt) and investment intensity 
(Invst3) are positively and significantly associated with a firm’s propensity to use market 
metrics, consistent with the notion that market metrics better capture performance-relevant 
information in complex decision-making environments.  
The positive and significant coefficient on BHAR3 in Model (4.ii) is inconsistent with our 
earlier prediction regarding past performance. The result instead suggests that firms with 
good past stock performance tend to choose market metrics for CEO p-v equity 
compensation. One possible interpretation is that firms choose performance metrics that are 
important for their goals and strategies, and this importance is correlated to the performance 
level achieved in the past. An alternative explanation is that CEOs “cherry-pick” metrics in 
which firms previously performed well to increase the vesting of their equity awards.16  
In the rest of the section, we re-test the hypotheses by treating the use of market metrics 
as a decision made jointly with those involving the other contractual features. This analysis 
alleviates the caveat of the findings in the preceding section where the choice of performance 
metrics is treated as exogenous. Panel B of Table 5 reports the joint estimation of each of the 
three contractual feature models—(1), (2), and (3)—with the market metric model (4), using 
seemingly unrelated probit regressions. The results are qualitative, similar to those in Section 
16 This “rent extraction” explanation relies on the premise that executives have the means to sustain past good 




                                                 
4.1. The robustness of our results suggests that after allowing for the joint determination of 
performance metrics and each of the other contractual features, the use of market metrics still 
has a dominant influence on firms’ use of RPE and long performance periods in CEO p-v 
equity compensation.  
 
4.3 Interdependence among contractual features 
The analyses in the preceding sections assume that the three contractual features—RPE, 
performance period length, and number of metrics—are independent in the design of p-v 
equity compensation. In this section, we extend the analyses by allowing these three features 
to be interdependent. Our goal is to examine whether firms adopt these features 
simultaneously and whether there is any trade-off in their use. 
The literature argues that RPE is more effective when common shocks in performance 
exceed idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., Gong et al. 2011; Janakiraman et al. 1992). Prolonging the 
performance period decreases short-term idiosyncratic noise in performance metrics and 
increases the relative weight of common shocks, which makes RPE more beneficial. 
Therefore, we argue that RPE is more compatible with long performance periods than with 
short performance periods. 
The relation between the number of metrics and the other two features is less clear. On 
the one hand, a firm may use multiple metrics along with RPE and long performance periods 
in p-v equity compensation because all of these features can potentially improve the 
informativeness of performance metrics. On the other hand, it can be costly to adopt multiple 
metrics because of the measurement cost and indirect cost such as conflicting incentives 
resulting from multiple metrics. Moreover, over a long period, the informational advantage of 
market metrics relative to accounting metrics is likely to decline because in the long run both 
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types of metrics tend to capture a firm’s underlying fundamentals more effectively. Thus, the 
need for multiple metrics could decrease over long periods. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows the associations among RPE, the performance period length, 
and the number of metrics. As predicted, the use of RPE is associated with long performance 
periods: 94.9% of RPE firms sets their performance periods for at least three years, whereas 
the percentage drops to only 62.0% for non-RPE firms. The relation between RPE and the 
number of metrics is not as clear: 52.1% of RPE firms uses multiple metrics, similar to non-
RPE firms at 51.9%. 
To examine the interdependence between the three contractual features in a multivariate 
setting, we use the following system of equations:  
 RPEt   = α0 + α1 Markett + α2 ComShkt-1 + α3 IndConcent-1   
     + α4 CEOWltht-1 + α5 CEOAget-1 + α6 |Ret_RkAdj|t-1   
     + α7 AdjROA3t-1 + Controls + εt , 
(5a) 
 LongPeriodt = β0 + β1 RPEt + β2 Markett + β3 AdjROA3t-1 + β4 ExCasht-1  
     + β5 Voltt-1 + β6 Invst3t-1 + β7 Segmtt-1 + Controls + ζt , 
(5b) 
 MultMetricst = γ0 + γ1 RPEt + γ2 LongPeriodt + γ3 Markett + γ4 Voltt-1  
    + γ5 Invst3t-1 + γ6 Segmtt-1 + Controls + ξt , 
(5c) 
 Markett = c0 + c1 RtVart-1 + c2 Segmtt-1 + c3 Invst3t-1 + c4 BHAR3t-1  
    + Controls + νt . 
(5d) 
 
Each of Equations (5a) through (5d) concerns one of the contractual features examined in 
the preceding sections: the use of RPE (RPE), performance period length (LongPeriod), 
number of metrics (MultMetrics), and the use of market metrics (Market). This system of 
equations has a recursive structure: That is, Equation (5a) only includes Market as an 
independent variable (includes neither LongPeriod nor MultMetrics), Equation (5b) includes 
RPE and Market, and Equation (5c) includes RPE, LongPeriod, and Market. This recursive 
structure is necessary for the estimation purpose because a system of fully endogenized latent 
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variables would be unidentifiable (see Greene 2011).17 The remaining (exogenous) 
independent variables are the same as those in Models (1) through (4). 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of the joint estimation of (5a) through (5d) by 
seemingly unrelated probit regressions. The findings are summarized as follows. First, in 
Equation (5b), the coefficient of LongPeriod is positive and significant (β ˆ1 = 0.827, p<0.01), 
suggesting that long performance periods are often co-adopted with RPE. Second, in 
Equation (5c), neither RPE nor LongPeriod is significant, a finding that is not entirely 
unexpected in light of the frequency counts in Panel A. Third, consistent with the results in 
the previous sections, Market is still positively and significantly associated with RPE and 
LongPeriod (in Equations (5a) and (5b), respectively), suggesting that our primary findings 
are robust even after we account for the potential interdependence among these features. Last, 
in Equation (5d), all determinants of the use of market metrics remain significant and 
consistent with the results in Section 4.2. This finding suggests that the choice of 
performance metrics is an independent process and not affected by choices of other 
contractual features; this lends additional support to our methodology of treating the use of 
market metrics as exogenous in Section 4.1. 
Overall, our analyses reveal the interdependence among the key contractual features in 
CEO p-v equity compensation. The finding that firms adopting RPE are more likely to set long 
performance periods suggests that these two features are complementary in their roles to 
improve the informativeness of performance metrics. However, we do not find a definite 
relation between the number of metrics and other features. 
17 A recursive system implies that certain endogenous variables are considered as exogenous to the other 
endogenous variables (e.g., in Equation (5a) through (5c), RPE is considered as exogenous to LongPeriod and 
MultMetrics). We also examine an alternative specification in which LongPeriod is treated as exogenous to 
RPE and MultMetrics. The results are similar.  
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V. SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES 
5.1 Grant of p-v equity awards and its influence on the design of p-v equity 
compensation 
As the goal of this study is to investigate the key contractual features of p-v equity 
compensation, we restrict our sample to those firms that grant this form of compensation to 
CEOs. An issue of sample selection may arise if a firm’s decision to adopt p-v equity 
compensation affects the design of such contracts. To address this concern, we first examine 
firms’ decision to adopt p-v equity compensation using Model (6):   
 PVt = a0 + a1 BHAR3t-1 + a2 Voltt-1 + a3 Invst3t-1 + a4 Segmtt-1  
    + Controls + εt  , 
(6) 
 
where PV equals one if a firm grants p-v equity awards, and zero otherwise. Following Bettis 
et al. (2010), we include prior performance (BHAR3), uncertainty in business environment 
(Volt), investment intensity (Invst3), and business complexity (Segmt), as well as firm and 
corporate governance characteristics as before. 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the frequency of firms with and without p-v equity awards. In 
our sample, 64.3% of the firms grants p-v equity awards, much higher than the adoption rates 
in earlier data (e.g., Bettis et al. 2010). Panel A also shows the increasing popularity of p-v 
equity compensation in our sample period: The adoption rate rises from 58.1% in 2006 to 
78.2% in 2013. Panel B shows the estimation result of Model (6) by logit regression. Firms 
with heavy investment (Inves3) are less likely to grant p-v equity awards, whereas firms with 
more independent boards (BrdIndp) are more likely to do so. Panel C re-estimates the 
contractual features of Models (1) through (4) using the Heckman selection procedure. All 
the key findings are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5, so the 
concern regarding sample selection bias is relieved. 
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5.2 Design of p-v equity contracts and future performance 
Throughout the analyses in Section 4, we rely on the informativeness principle to 
hypothesize and predict the relations between contractual features. A natural question arises 
concerning the validity of such a premise. If these compensation contracts are indeed 
efficiently designed, they should incentivize CEOs and foretell better future performance 
compared to cases in which compensation is inefficiently designed. Analyzing the relation 
between contract design and future performance not only demonstrates the economic 
consequence of compensation design, but also helps to validate our underlying assumption of 
efficient contracting. 
To test whether the design of p-v equity compensation is related to firms’ future 
performance, we compare future operating performance of two contrasting groups, 
distinguished by their contract designs. The first group of firms designs p-v equity 
compensation according to Hypotheses 1 and 2, which are derived from the informativeness 
principle and supported by the data. This group uses market metrics in conjunction with RPE 
and long performance periods. The second group consists of the remaining firms, whose p-v 
equity compensation does not follow this configuration. Following Bettis et al. (2010), we 
measure operating performance by industry-adjusted return on assets. 
As Table 8 shows, the “consistent design” group achieves significantly better operating 
performance than the contrasting group, up to the subsequent four years. The results support 
the premise of our empirical analyses that such a configuration of contractual features reflects 
the efficacy of compensation contracts and also suggest that p-v equity compensation is not 
merely a means for CEOs to extract rent or placate shareholders. 
5.3 Influence of compensation consultants on contractual features 
Prior studies have shown that compensation consultants affect CEO pay levels (e.g., 
Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012). Cadman et al. (2010) 
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indicate that compensation consultants have different specialties. For example, F. W. Cook 
specializes in compensation design for CEOs and directors, whereas other top consulting 
firms provide a wider range of services. As a supplementary analysis, we examine whether 
compensation consultants influence the design of p-v equity compensation. We collect by 
hand the compensation consultant data for our sample between 2006 and 2008. Over this 
period, the top four consulting firms are F. W. Cook (hired by 21.3% of the sample), Towers 
Perrin (21.0%), Hewitt (15.4%), and Mercer (15.4%), whose market shares are well ahead of 
the fifth firm, Watson Wyatt (6.2%). We re-estimate the contractual features of Models (1) 
through (4) using dummy variables for the four most popular consulting firms. In the 
untabulated results, we find that controlling for consulting firms does not alter our key 
conclusions about the influence of performance metrics on the other contractual features. The 
results also show some style effects of consulting firms on the design of p-v equity 
compensation: For example, firms hiring Towers Perrin and Hewitt tend to set long 
performance periods, those hiring F. W. Cook use fewer performance metrics, and those 
hiring Hewitt are more likely to choose market metrics. 
5.4 Influence of other forms of compensation on the design of p-v equity awards 
Because CEOs receive a mix of compensation, one may ask how other forms of 
compensation influence the design of p-v equity awards. As a robustness check, we examine 
the effect of t-v equity awards and annual bonuses, two key components of executive 
compensation. First, we examine whether the pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS) of t-v equity 
awards affects the key features of p-v equity awards. PPS is chosen because of its central role 
in the efficacy of t-v equity awards (in contrast to p-v equity compensation, the design of t-v 
equity compensation is much simpler). Empirically, we follow Core and Guay (2002) and 
measure PPS by the delta and vega of t-v equity awards (in the form of stock options, 
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restricted stock, and restricted stock units). The untabulated results show that our main 
conclusions are robust to controlling delta and vega of t-v equity awards. 
Second, we examine whether the performance metrics in annual bonuses affect the 
contractual features of p-v equity awards. Because annual bonuses are a major form of 
incentive pay that focuses on short-term performance, it is plausible to assume that annual 
bonuses are designed in conjunction with p-v equity awards. The design of annual bonuses is 
simpler and the use of performance metrics is the most prominent feature. Empirically, we 
include in Models (1) through (4) a set of dummy variables, each indicating one of the main 
types of metrics used in annual bonuses: earnings, asset utilization, sales, cash, market, other 
financial, and non-financial. The untabulated results show that our main results are robust to 
the control for performance metrics in annual bonuses. 
5.5 Different modeling of the performance period and the number of metrics 
In the main analyses, we dichotomize the performance period length and the number of 
metrics.18 The decision is justified because the original data are discrete and not suitable for 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Specialized count data models, such as the Poisson 
regression and negative binomial regression, are subject to restrictive assumptions. As a 
robustness check, we use two alternative methods, OLS regressions and zero-truncated 
Poisson regressions, to estimate Model (2) for the performance period length and Model (3) 
for the number of metrics. In both cases, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported 
in Table 4. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We investigate the determination of and interdependence among the contractual features 
of CEO p-v equity compensation, with an aim to shed light on the complex design of 
18 Recall that LongPeriod equals one when the performance period is at least three years and zero otherwise; 
MultMetrics equals one when the number of metrics is more than one and zero otherwise. 
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compensation contracts. This investigation is warranted because the existing research on 
compensation design is largely confined to annual bonuses and t-v stock options and does not 
fully address the intricate relations among features of p-v equity compensation.  
Although p-v equity compensation provides stronger incentives to executives than 
traditional t-v equity compensation, it also exposes executives to higher risk. Following the 
core insight that an efficient compensation contract trades incentive against risk, we 
hypothesize that the three salient features of p-v equity compensation—RPE, performance 
period length, and number of metrics—are configured to filter excessive risk and to increase 
the informativeness of performance metrics.  
We empirically test these predictions in a sample of S&P 500 industrial firms granting p-
v equity awards to CEOs between 2006 and 2013. As predicted, we find that firms using 
market metrics are more likely to adopt RPE and to set long performance periods. However, 
we find no relation between the use of market metrics and the number of metrics. 
We next examine firms’ decision to use market metrics in p-v equity compensation. The 
results show that firms with less volatile market metrics, better past stock returns, and 
complex businesses are more likely to use market metrics. Importantly, our main findings 
concerning the effect of performance metrics on the other features are robust after allowing 
for the joint determination of contractual features.  
We further explore the interdependence among RPE, the performance period length, and 
the number of metrics and document that RPE complements long performance periods in 
enhancing the informativeness of performance metrics. Moreover, the results demonstrate the 
consequences of contractual design: Firms that use market metrics in conjunction with RPE 
and long performance periods for p-v equity compensation exhibit better future operating 
performance than the rest of the firms. Our results are robust after we control for the grant 
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decision of p-v equity awards, the impact of compensation consultants, the features of t-v 
equity awards and annual bonuses, and alternative estimation techniques.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that key contractual features of p-v 
equity compensation are configured to enhance the informativeness of performance metrics 
and to isolate executives from unwanted risk. Our results reveal the complex relations among 
these features and are relevant to the evolving practice of executive compensation. Against 
the backdrop of intense public scrutiny, this study can contribute to the heated debate 
concerning flaws and possible reforms of executive compensation. Future research may 
investigate the design of p-v equity compensation in relation to executive turnover and its 
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APPENDIX A: VOTING GUIDELINES FOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION BY GLASS LEWIS 
 
The 2015 voting guidelines of Glass Lewis specify certain elements that are common to 
most well-structured long-term incentive plans, including: 
• No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions; 
• Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management; 
• Two or more performance metrics;  
• At least one relative performance metric that compares the company’s performance to a 
relevant peer group or index; 
• Performance periods of at least three years; 
• Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while 
not encouraging excessive risk-taking; and 
• Individual limits expressed as a percentage of base salary. 
Glass Lewis (2015) also suggests that performance measures should be carefully selected 
and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, 




APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Label  Computation 
AdjROA3 Industry-adjusted 
ROA 
= A firm’s ROA minus 2-digit SIC industry’s average ROA; then 
averaged over prior three years 
BHAR3 Abnormal returns = Market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns, cumulated over 
prior three years 
BM Book-to-market ratio = Book equity/market capitalization, where book equity is common 
equity, adjusted for deferred tax liabilities, and market 
capitalization is from four months after fiscal year end 
BrdIndp Board independence = Number of independent directors / total number of directors 
CEOAge CEO’s age   
CEONew New CEO = 1 if a new CEO is appointed in the current fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise 
CEOWlth CEO wealth = The natural logarithm of the value of equity (including both 
stocks and stock options) held by CEO 
ComShk Common shock = R2 of the regression of a firm’s stock returns on value-weighted 
2-digit SIC industry index returns over 36 months 
Dual Dual role of CEO = 1 if CEO also holds the role of chairman of the board, and 0 
otherwise 
ExCash CEO’s excess cash 
compensation 
= CEO’s annual cash compensation (=salary+bonus) – average 
CEO cash compensation in industry peers (defined by two-digit 
SIC, size decile, and year) 
LongPeriod Long performance 
period 
= 1 if the performance period is at least three years and 0 otherwise 
IH Institutional 
ownership 




= The sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms’ sales 
within each two-digit SIC industry 
Invst3 Investment intensity = (R&D + advertising + capital expenditures)/average total assets, 
averaged over prior three years 
Market Use of market 
metrics 
= 1 if stock returns or prices are used as performance metrics in p-v 
equity awards 
MultMetrics Use of multiple 
metrics 
= 1 if more than one metric is used , and 0 otherwise 
PV Granting p-v equity 
awards 
= 1 if a firm grants p-v equity awards (in forms of restricted stocks, 
restricted stock units, stock options or SARs) to its executives, 
and 0 otherwise. 
|Ret_RkAdj| Absolute value of 
size-adjusted returns 
= the absolute difference between a firm’s annual stock returns and 





= 1 if any performance metric in a firm’s CEO p-v equity 
compensation is benchmarked against its peers or an index, and 0 
otherwise 
RtVar Relative volatility of 
returns to earnings 
= Standard deviation of daily returns over the past year, defined by 
standard deviation of ROA over the past 12 quarters 
Segmt   Number of business segments 
Size Size = Natural log of market capitalization 
Volt Return volatility = Standard deviation of daily stock returns over previous 12 









Panel A. Components of CEO compensation, as percentages of total compensation value 
 
 
Panel B. Performance- and time-vested components, as percentages of total equity 
compensation value 
 
This figure shows performance-vested equity awards and other components of CEO compensation as percentages 
of total compensation value (Panel A) and total equity compensation value (Panel B). The sample is S&P 500 
industrial firms (financials and utilities excluded) between 2006 and 2013.  
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Table 1.  Construction of the Sample and Changes of Sample Size 
 
Sample selection process Number of firm-year 
S&P 500 firms between fiscal years 2006-2013 4,000 
− No proxy statements due to delisting, M&A, etc. (8) 
− Financial institutions and utilities (986) 
− No equity grants to CEOs (269) 
− Only t-v equity grants to CEOs    (1,058) 
Firms granting p-v equity awards to CEOs 1,679 
− Missing accounting, price, corporate governance data      (237) 





Table 2.  Key Contractual Features of CEO Performance-vested Equity Compensation 
 
Panel A. Types of performance metrics 









2006-08  435 240 151 98 41 132 29 26 
  (55.2%) (34.7%) (22.5%) ( 9.4%) (30.3%) ( 6.7%) ( 6.0%) 
2009-13 1,007 510 263 237 110 417 63 50 
  (50.6%) (26.1%) (23.5%) (10.9%) (41.4%) ( 6.3%) ( 5.0%) 
2006-13  1,442 750 414 335 151 549 92 76 
  (52.0%) (28.7%) (23.2%) (10.5%) (38.1%) ( 6.4%) ( 5.3%) 
 
Panel B. Use of RPE and length of performance period 
  Use of RPE  Length of performance period(years) 
 N Yes No  ≤1 2 3 4 ≥5 
2006-08  435 162 273  82 27 287 19 20 
  (37.2%) (62.8%)  (18.9%) ( 6.2%) (66.0%) ( 4.4%) ( 4.6%) 
2009-13 1,007 422 585  210 37 701 26 33 
  (41.9%) (58.1%)  (20.9%) ( 3.7%) (69.6%) ( 2.6%) ( 3.3%) 
2006-13  1,442 584 858  292 64 988 45 53 
  (40.5%) (59.5%)  (20.2%) ( 4.4%) (68.5%) ( 3.1%) ( 3.7%) 
 
Panel C. Number of metrics  
  Number of metrics 
 N 1 2 3 4 ≥5 
2006-08 435 213 173 38 11 0 
  (49.0%) (39.8%) ( 8.7%) ( 2.5%) ( 0.0%) 
2009-13 1,007 536 328 115 27 1 
  (53.2%) (32.6%) (11.4%) ( 2.7%) ( 0.1%) 
2006-13  1,442 749 501 153 38 1 
  (51.9%) (34.7%) (10.6%) ( 2.6%) ( 0.1%) 
This table shows the key contractual features of CEO p-v equity compensation. When a CEO receives more than 
one p-v equity award, only the features of the award with the largest fair value are considered. Panel A shows the 
types of performance metrics specified in p-v equity awards. The “Earnings” category includes all metrics directly 
derived from earnings. The “Asset utilization” category includes return on equity, return on assets, return on 
invested capital, EVA, working capital, etc. The “Sales” category includes all metrics directly related to 
sales/revenue. The “Cash” category includes operating cash flow, free cash flow, and other cash measures. The 
“Market” category includes stock prices or stock returns. The “Other financial” category includes financial 
measures other than the above measures. The “Non-financial” category includes all non-financial metrics, such 
as customer satisfaction, safety, innovation, etc. Panel B shows the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
and the length of the performance period. A firm is considered as using RPE if it benchmarks any performance 
metric against peers (including an index). The performance period is a period over which performance is measured 
for the purpose of determining the payout of CEOs’ p-v equity awards. Panel C reports numbers of metrics. 





Table 3.  Relation between the Use of RPE and Performance Metrics 
 
Panel A. Frequency counts by RPE and type of performance metrics 
Use of market Use of RPE  
metrics Yes No Total 
Yes 482 67 549 
 (87.8%) (12.2%)  
No 102 791 893 
 (11.4%) (88.6%)  
Total 584 858 1,442 
 (40.5%) (59.5%)  
 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics of key variables 
Variable 
(N=1,442) Mean STDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Corr. with 
RPE 
RPE 0.405 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000  
Market 0.381 0.486 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.755*** 
ComShk 0.465 0.223 0.000 0.297 0.478 0.631 0.997 0.142*** 
IndConcen 0.090 0.084 0.026 0.039 0.050 0.109 0.456 -0.079*** 
CEOWlth 10.189 1.349 3.112 9.400 10.212 10.956 14.309 0.041 
CEOAge 55.950 5.772 39.000 52.000 56.000 60.000 75.000 0.114*** 
|Ret_RkAdj| 0.091 0.109 0.000 0.021 0.058 0.118 0.893 -0.030 





Panel C. Use of market metrics and RPE: Logit regression 
  Dependent variable: RPE 
 Pred. (1 .i)  (1. ii)  (1.i ii) 
 sign Coef. M.E.  Coef. M.E.  Coef. M.E 
Market +    4.122*** 0.774***  4.237*** 0.785*** 
     (15.24) (28.66)  (14.90) (28.86) 
ComShk + 1.302*** 0.312***  0.595 0.139  0.551 0.127 
  (2.39) (2.40)  (0.78) (0.78)  (0.72) (0.71) 
IndConcen − -2.532* -0.607*  0.403 0.094  0.416 0.096 
  (-1.54) (-1.55)  (0.17) (0.17)  (0.18) (0.18) 
CEOWlth − 0.002 0.000  0.138 0.032  0.157 0.036 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (1.03) (1.03)  (1.27) (1.27) 
CEOAge − 0.030** 0.007**  0.027 0.006  0.011 0.002 
  (1.80) (1.81)  (1.16) (1.17)  (0.44) (0.45) 
|Ret_RkAdj| − -0.461 -0.111  -0.332 -0.077  -0.345 -0.080 
  (-0.76) (-0.76)  (-0.38) (-0.38)  (-0.40) (-0.40) 
AdjROA3 +/− -1.407 -0.337  1.398 0.326  2.244 0.518 
  (-0.75) (-0.75)  (0.52) (0.52)  (0.80) (0.79) 
BM  0.582** 0.139**  0.343 0.080  0.519 0.120 
  (1.70) (1.70)  (0.84) (0.84)  (1.25) (1.24) 
Size  0.107 0.026  -0.092 -0.021  -0.226* -0.052* 
  (0.94) (0.94)  (-0.64) (-0.64)  (-1.36) (-1.36) 
IH        -1.323 -0.306 
        (-1.25) (-1.25) 
BrdIndp        4.574*** 1.056*** 
        (3.94) (3.78) 
Dual        0.564** 0.127** 
        (1.95) (2.04) 
CEONew        -0.145 -0.033 
        (-0.48) (-0.49) 
Year fixed effe Ct Yes   Yes   Yes  
Intercept  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Pseudo R2  0.047   0.478   0.501  
N  1,442   1,442   1,442  
This table reports the use of RPE in CEO p-v equity compensation. Panel A shows frequency counts by the use 
of RPE and metric types. Panel B shows summary statistics and Pearson correlations of the key variables for 
Hypothesis 1. Panel C shows logit regression of RPE on Market and other determinants. RPE equals one if any 
performance metric is benchmarked against peers (including an index), and zero otherwise. Market equals one if 
a firm uses either stock returns or prices as performance metrics, and zero otherwise. ComShk is common shocks 
to a firm’s performance, measured as the R2 from regressing firm-specific stock returns on value-weighted 
industry returns over prior 36 months. IndConcen is industry concentration, calculated as the sum of squared 
market shares of individual firms’ sales within each two-digit SIC industry. CEOWlth is the CEO’s wealth, 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the value of a CEO’s equity holding (both stocks and stock options). 
CEOAge is the age of CEO. |Ret_RkAdj| is the absolute difference between a firm’s annual stock returns and the 
median annual stock returns for the firm’s corresponding decile. AdjROA3 is industry-adjusted return on assets, 
averaged over prior three years. BM is the book-to-market ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization. IH is institutional holdings, which equals the number of shares held by institutional investors, scaled 
by the total number of shares outstanding. BrdIndp is board independence, calculated as the number of 
independent directors, scaled by the total number of directors. Dual equals one if the CEO is also the chairperson 
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of the board, and zero otherwise. CEONew indicates a new CEO. See Appendix B for more details. Z-statistics 
(in parentheses) are based on standard errors which are clustered by firms. ***, **, * indicate being significant at 





Table 4.  Relations between Performance Period and Metric Numbers and Performance 
Metrics 
 
Panel A. Frequency counts by performance period, metric numbers, and metric types 
Use of market Performan ce period  Number o f metrics  
metrics 1~2 years ≥ 3 years  1 metric ≥ 2 metrics Total 
Yes 22 527  300 249 549 
 (4.0%) (96.0%)  (54.6%) (45.4%)  
No 334 559  449 444 893 
 (37.4%) (62.6%)  (50.3%) (49.7%)  
Total 356 1,086  749 693 1,442 
 (24.7%) (75.3%)  (51.9%) (48.1%)  
 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics of key variables 
Variable        Corr. with 
(N=1,442) Mean STDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max LongPeriod MultMetrics 
LongPeriod 0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000   
MultMetrics 0.481 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000   
Market 0.381 0.486 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.376*** -0.042 
AdjROA3 0.002 0.051 -0.189 -0.026 0.002 0.029 0.143 0.031  
ExCash 0.019 0.517 -0.784 -0.265 -0.058 0.147 4.966 -0.016  
Volt 1.219 0.133 0.619 1.149 1.219 1.295 1.748 -0.021 -0.026 
Invst3 0.090 0.057 0.007 0.049 0.080 0.115 0.351 0.036 0.011 




Panel C. Use of market metrics and performance period: Logit regression 
  Dependent variable: LongPeriod 
 Pred. (2 .i)  (2. ii)  (2.i ii) 
 sign Coef. M.E.  Coef. M.E.  Coef. M.E 
Market +    2.654*** 0.328***  2.647*** 0.314*** 
     (8.97) (10.13)  (8.74) (9.99) 
AdjROA3 + 1.327 0.241  2.606 0.375  3.431* 0.473* 
  (0.56) (0.56)  (1.07) (1.07)  (1.47) (1.45) 
ExCash − -0.319* -0.058*  -0.211 -0.030  -0.122 -0.017 
  (-1.53) (-1.54)  (-0.96) (-0.97)  (-0.60) (-0.60) 
Volt + 0.025 0.005  -0.074 -0.011  -0.353 -0.049 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (-0.11) (-0.11)  (-0.51) (-0.51) 
Invst3 + 2.652* 0.482*  1.042 0.150  2.329 0.321 
  (1.32) (1.32)  (0.46) (0.46)  (0.98) (0.97) 
Segmt + 0.081* 0.015*  0.027 0.004  0.017 0.002 
  (1.51) (1.52)  (0.47) (0.47)  (0.30) (0.30) 
BM  0.484* 0.088*  0.203 0.029  0.365 0.050 
  (1.46) (1.44)  (0.61) (0.61)  (1.04) (1.03) 
Size  0.258*** 0.047***  0.200* 0.029**  0.019 0.003 
  (2.35) (2.37)  (1.63) (1.65)  (0.14) (0.14) 
IH        -2.644*** -0.364*** 
        (-2.52) (-2.52) 
BrdIndp        2.828*** 0.390*** 
        (2.66) (2.55) 
Dual        0.559** 0.081** 
        (2.25) (2.17) 
CEONew        0.301 0.038* 
        (1.23) (1.34) 
Year fixed effe ct Yes   Yes   Yes  
Intercept  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Pseudo R2  0.026   0.166   0.199  





Panel D. Use of market metrics and metric numbers: Logit regression 
  Dependent variable: MultMetrics 
 Pred. (3 .i)  (3. ii)  (3.i ii) 
 sign Coef. M.E.  Coef. M.E.  Coef. M.E 
Market −    -0.214 -0.053  -0.229 -0.057 
     (-0.97) (-0.97)  (-1.05) (-1.05) 
Volt + 0.355 0.088  0.356 0.089  0.420 0.105 
  (0.62) (0.62)  (0.62) (0.62)  (0.73) (0.73) 
Invst3 + -0.027 -0.007  0.195 0.049  0.766 0.191 
  (-0.01) (-0.01)  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.41) (0.41) 
Segmt + 0.051 0.013  0.057 0.014  0.059 0.015 
  (1.09) (1.09)  (1.19) (1.19)  (1.23) (1.23) 
BM  -0.473* -0.118*  -0.426 -0.106  -0.430 -0.107 
  (-1.39) (-1.39)  (-1.25) (-1.25)  (-1.25) (-1.25) 
Size  0.017 0.004  0.026 0.007  -0.028 -0.007 
  (0.16) (0.16)  (0.25) (0.25)  (-0.25) (-0.25) 
IH        -0.427 -0.107 
        (-0.55) (-0.55) 
BrdIndp        0.276 0.069 
        (0.31) (0.31) 
Dual        0.362** 0.090** 
        (1.78) (1.80) 
CEONew        -0.128 -0.032 
        (-0.71) (-0.71) 
Year fixed effe ct Yes   Yes   Yes  
Intercept  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Pseudo R2  0.011   0.012   0.019  
N  1,442   1,442   1,442  
This table reports the relations between use of market metrics and performance period/metric numbers in CEO p-
v equity compensation. Panel A shows frequency counts by performance period/metric numbers and metric types. 
Panel B shows summary statistics and Pearson correlations of the key variables for Hypotheses 2 and 3. Panel C 
shows logit regression of LongPeriod on Market and other determinants. LongPeriod equals one if the 
performance period is equal to or more than three years, and zero otherwise. ExCash is CEO’s excess cash 
compensation, calculated as the difference between a CEO’s annual cash compensation (=salary+bonus) and 
average CEO cash compensation in industry peers (defined by two-digit SIC, size decile, and year). The rest 
variables are defined the same as in the preceding tables; see Appendix B for more details. Panel D shows logit 
regression of MultMetrics on Market and other determinants. MultMetrics equals one if a firm uses more than one 
metric, and zero otherwise. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors which are clustered by firms. 




Table 5.  The Choice of Performance Metrics and Joint Determination of Performance 
Metrics and Other Contractual Features 
 
Panel A. Use of market metrics: Logit regression 
  Dependent variable: Market 
 Pred. (4 .i)  (4. ii) 
 Sign Coef. M.E.  Coef. M.E. 
RtVar − -0.090*** -0.021***  -0.084** -0.019** 
  (-2.33) (-2.35)  (-2.28) (-2.30) 
Invst3 + 3.820** 0.886**  4.042** 0.937** 
  (2.04) (2.03)  (2.13) (2.13) 
Segmt + 0.108** 0.025**  0.108** 0.025** 
  (2.08) (2.08)  (2.09) (2.08) 
AdjROA3 + 0.691 0.160    
  (0.34) (0.34)    
BHAR3 ?    0.205** 0.048** 
     (1.72) (1.72) 
BM  0.890*** 0.207***  0.988*** 0.229*** 
  (2.38) (2.38)  (2.57) (2.57) 
Size  0.165* 0.038*  0.156 0.036 
  (1.34) (1.34)  (1.26) (1.26) 
IH  -1.125* -0.261*  -1.269* -0.294* 
  (-1.37) (-1.36)  (-1.52) (-1.52) 
BrdIndp  3.061*** 0.710***  3.117*** 0.723*** 
  (3.09) (3.10)  (3.15) (3.15) 
Dual  -0.063 -0.015  -0.062 -0.014 
  (-0.29) (-0.29)  (-0.29) (-0.29) 
CEONew  0.093 0.022  0.119 0.028 
  (0.49) (0.48)  (0.62) (0.61) 
Year fixed effect  Yes   Yes  
Intercept  Yes   Yes  
Pseudo R2  0.089   0.091  




Panel B. Joint determination of metric types and each of the three features—RPE, performance period length, number of metrics: Bivariate 
Probit Regression (SUR) 
This table reports the use of market metrics in CEO p-v equity compensation. Panel A shows logit regression of Market on its determinants. Market equals one if a firm use 
stock returns or prices as performance metrics, and zero otherwise. RtVar is the relative volatility between market and accounting metrics. Segmt is the number of business 
 Pred. Dependent  : RPE (1.i)  Pred. Dependent: Lon gPeriod (2.i)  Pred. Dependent: Mu ltMetrics (3.i) 
First equation  sign Coef. M.E.  sign Coef. M.E.  sign Coef. M.E. 
Market + 3.175*** 0.878***  + 2.484*** 0.593***  − -0.519 -0.201 
  (25.02) (56.55)   (19.65) (18.79)   (-0.60) (-0.62) 
ComShk + 0.284 0.035         
  (0.87) (0.86)         
IndConcen + 0.247 0.030         
  (0.25) (0.25)         
CEOWlth + 0.071* 0.009         
  (1.29) (1.25)         
CEOAge + 0.012 0.002         
  (1.20) (1.21)         
|Ret_RkAdj| − -0.147 -0.018         
  (-0.38) (-0.38)         
AdjROA3 + 0.978 0.120  + 1.903** 0.479**     
  (0.83) (0.81)   (2.15) (2.16)     
ExCash     − -0.053 -0.013     
      (-0.62) (-0.62)     
Volt     − -0.067 -0.017  + 0.182 0.070 
      (-0.25) (-0.25)   (0.49) (0.48) 
Invst3     + -1.036 -0.261  + 0.486 0.186 
      (-0.79) (-0.79)   (0.37) (0.38) 
Segmt     + -0.024 -0.006  + 0.044 0.017* 
      (-0.82) (-0.82)   (1.28) (1.35) 
Control  Same as Table 3   Same as Table 4   Same as Table 4 
Second equation (4.ii)  Dependent: Ma  rket (omitted)   Dependent: Ma  rket (omitted)   Dependent: Ma  rket (omitted) 
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segments. Invst3 is investment intensity, calculated as the sum of R&D, advertising, capital expenditures, scaled by average total assets, and is then averaged over past three 
years. BHAR3 is market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns, cumulated over prior three years. The rest variables are defined in the preceding tables; see Appendix B for 
more details. Panel B reports the joint estimation of metric types and each of the three contractual feature (RPE, performance period, number of metrics), using seemingly 
unrelated probit regressions. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors which are clustered by firms. ***, **, * indicate being significant at levels of 1%, 5%, 




Table 6.  Interdependence among RPE, Performance Period, and Metric Numbers 
 
Panel A. Frequency counts 
   Performance period (yrs.)  Metric numbers 
RPE use  1~2 ≥ 3  1 ≥ 2 
Yes 584  30 554  280 304 
 [40.5%]  (5.1%) (94.9%)  (47.9%) (52.1%) 
No 858  326 532  413 445 
 [59.5%]  (38.0%) (62.0%)  (48.1%) (51.9%) 
Total 1,442  356 1,086  693 749 





Panel B. Interdependence among RPE, performance period, and metric numbers: Seemingly 
unrelated probit regression 
 (5a ) Dependent:  (5b ) Dependent:  (5c ) Dependent:  (5d ) Dependent: 
      RPE  L ongPeriod  M ultMetrics    Market 
 Sign Coef.  Sign Coef.  Sign Coef.  Sign Coef. 
Market + 2.675***  + 1.193***  − -0.112    
  (15.49)   (3.37)   (-0.29)    
RPE    + 0.827***  ? 0.094    
     (2.44)   (0.29)    
LongPeriod       ? 0.142    
        (0.54)    
ComShk + 0.119          
  (0.34)          
IndConcen − 0.252          
  (0.22)          
CEOWlth − 0.070          
  (1.16)          
CEOAge − 0.012          
  (1.04)          
|Ret_RkAdj| − -0.194          
  (-0.45)          
AdjROA3  0.491  + 1.472       
  (0.37)   (1.11)       
ExCash    − -0.075       
     (-0.57)       
Volt    + 0.169  + 0.040    
     (0.48)   (0.12)    
Invst3    + 0.471  + -0.101  + 2.560** 
     (0.34)   (-0.09)   (2.23) 
Segmt    + 0.005  + 0.029  + 0.068** 
     (0.16)   (1.01)   (2.17) 
RtVar          − -0.046** 
           (-2.23) 
BHAR3          ? 0.106* 
           (1.50) 
Control variab les As in (1.i)   As in (2.i)   As in (3.i)   As in (4.ii) 
Intercept  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Fixed effect           Year 
N  1,442          
This table shows the interdependence among RPE, performance period, and metric numbers, while also 
accounting for the use of market metrics. Panel A reports frequency counts by these three features. Panel B 
estimates a system of four probit models, whose dependent variables are RPE (in (5a)), LongPeriod (in (5b)), 
MultMetrics (in (5c)), and Market (in (5d)), respectively. The specification of Model (5a) is identical to that of 
(1.i) in Table 3; Model (5b) is the same as Model (2.i) in Table 4, except for RPE being an additional independent 
variable; Model (5c) has RPE and LongPeriod as additional independent variables, but otherwise is same as Model 
(3.i) in Table 4; and Model (5d) is identical to (4.ii) in Panel A of Table 5. See Appendix B for detailed variable 





Table 7.  Grants of P-V Equity Awards and Their Key Contractual Features 
Panel A. Frequency counts of firms granting CEO p-v equity awards vs. firms not granting 
 Grant of p-v equity  
 Yes No N 
2006 140 101 241 
 (58.1%) (41.9%)  
2007 162 120 282 
 (57.4%) (42.6%)  
2008 133 102 235 
 (56.6%) (43.4%)  
2009 161 131 292 
 (55.1%) (44.9%)  
2010 189 116 305 
 (62.0%) (38.0%)  
2011 208 90 298 
 (69.8%) (30.2%)  
2012 216 75 291 
 (74.2%) (25.8%)  
2013 233 65 298 
 (78.2%) (21.8%)  
2006-08  435 323 758 
 (57.4%) (42.6%)  
2009-13  1,007 477 1,484 
 (67.9%) (32.1%)  
2006-13  1,442 800 2,242 







Panel B. Granting CEO p-v equity awards: Logit regression 
 Pred. (6) Depe ndent: PV 
 sign Coef. M.E. 
BHAR3  -0.031 -0.007 
  (-0.32) (-0.32) 
Volt   0.040 0.009 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
Invst3   -3.553*** -0.806*** 
  (-2.59) (-2.59) 
Segmt   0.047 0.011 
  (1.09) (1.09) 
Size   0.089 0.020 
  (0.95) (0.95) 
IH   -0.597 -0.135 
  (-0.85) (-0.86) 
BrdIndp   1.434** 0.325** 
  (2.09) (2.09) 
Dual  -0.214 -0.048 
  (-1.24) (-1.25) 
CEONew   -0.086 -0.020 
  (-0.57) (-0.56) 
Fixed effect  Year  
Pseudo R2  0.045  





Panel C. Determination of key contractual features, controlling for grant decision: Heckman 
section procedure 
 (1 ) Dependent:  (2 ) Dependent:  (3 ) Dependent:  (4 ) Dependent: 
First      RPE  L ongPeriod  M ultMetrics    Market 
equation Sign Coef.  Sign Coef.  Sign Coef.  Sign Coef. 
Market + 1.936**  + 1.258***  − -0.098    
  (2.07)   (9.77)   (-0.96)    
ComShk + 0.273          
  (0.97)          
IndConcen − 0.224          
  (0.24)          
CEOWlth − 0.057          
  (0.75)          
CEOAge − 0.009          
  (0.60)          
|Ret_RkAdj| − -0.192          
  (-0.56)          
AdjROA3  0.470  + 1.394       
  (0.43)   (1.22)       
ExCash    − -0.091       
     (-0.81)       
Volt    + -0.036  + 0.205    
     (-0.10)   (0.72)    
Invst3    + 1.571*  + -0.907  + 2.979*** 
     (1.50)   (-0.93)   (2.74) 
Segmt    + 0.003  + 0.043*  + 0.051* 
     (0.11)   (1.63)   (1.43) 
RtVar          − -0.044** 
           (-2.07) 
BHAR3          ? 0.118** 
           (1.71) 
Control variab les As in (1.i)   As in (2.i)   As in (3.i)   As in (4.ii) 
Intercept  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Fixed effect  Year   Year   Year   Year 
Second equati on    As (6)      As (6)      As (6)      As (6) 
N      2,242       2,242       2,242       2,242 
This table reports the determination of key contractual features, controlling for grant decision. Panel A shows 
frequencies of S&P 500 industrial firms with and without CEO p-v equity awards. Panel B estimates the 
propensity of granting p-v equity awards to CEO, where the dependent variable PV equals one if a firm does so, 
and zero otherwise. Panel C re-estimates the individual feature models ((1)–(4) separately) along with the grant 
model (6) by Heckman selection models with binary dependent variables. See Appendix B for detailed variable 
definitions. All models include year-fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firms. Z-statistics are shown in 






Table 8.  Contractual Design of CEO P-V Equity Compensation and Future 
Performance 
  Future industry-adjust ed ROA  
Consistent design Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Yes 0.096 0.099 0.092 0.096 0.098 
No 0.079 0.077 0.076 0.081 0.085 
Difference 0.017** 0.022*** 0.016** 0.015* 0.013 
N (No vs. Yes) (960/458) (942/448) (863/392) (731/293) (582/219) 
This table reports future operating performance subsequent to the grant of p-v equity awards. “Consistent design” 
refers to firms which use market metrics, RPE, and long performance periods simultaneously. The table shows 
mean industry-adjusted ROA by year. The difference is tested by one-sided t-test and ***, **, and * denote 
significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The last row shows numbers of observations for 
the no- and yes-groups. 
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